BOOK REVIEWS
In Defense of Public Order: The Emerging Field of Sanction Law. By RICHARD
ARENS and HAROLD D. LASSWELL. New York: Columbia University Press,
1961. Pp. x, 314. $7.50.
The study of sanctions-the spectrum of means available for the enforcement of legal norms-is rapidly becoming a central preoccupation of students
of the legal order. It has not so far progressed much beyond the recognition
that the problems are important, intricate, and almost entirely unexplored.
I have no doubt that legal scholarship will be given over in increasingly large
measure to the development of a jurisprudence of sanctions. It is equally clear
to me that insights and techniques drawn from the behavioral sciences will
play an important role in this development. Consequently, I approached this
call by a lawyer and an eminent behavioral scientist for the systematic study
of "sanction law" with interest and sympathy. Both interest and sympathy
rapidly waned. The book is not successful. The reasons are not altogether
easy to articulate but an effort to articulate them is due authors who, whatever the shortcomings of their work, cannot be accused of triviality.
The book is divided into two parts. The first and by far the longer part,
entitled "The Challenge of Present Failures," undertakes to present the concept of "sanction law" and to demonstrate that, at present, sanctioning policies are "confused, inconsistent, and fraught with dangerous consequences
for the basic values and institutions of the United States."' This part of the
book is organized in a rather peculiar fashion. After an introductory chapter
which defines "sanction law" in terms that we will presently examine, there
appears a cursory introduction to "value-institution study"-a series of constructs familiar enough to students of Lasswell's work 2 - but here presented
in a fashion that can hardly satisfy any but the most passive and acquiescent
reader. It is stated, with little elaboration, that the values of a body politic include power, wealth, rectitude, skill, enlightenment, well-being and affection,
that in a democratic society these values are expected to be widely distributed,
and that the "sanctioning process" as it presently operates tends adversely to
affect the desired wide distribution of these values.3 The demonstration then
proceeds in a series of chapters each of which is devoted to, or at least captioned with, one of the "values": e.g., "Sanctioning Measures and the Sharing of Respect"; "Sanctioning Measures and the Sharing of Skill", etc., etc.
1 P. 12.
2 See, e.g., LASSWELL, POWER AND PERSONALITY (1948).

3Pp. 13-14.
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Each of these chapters is an enumeration of instances in which the shortcomings of the "sanctioning system" are thought to bear adversely on the
particular "value" involved.
Two comments are in order about this framework. In the first place, the
value categories are stated at such a high level of abstraction that it is very
difficult for the authors to give them content. As a result, the relationship between the values and the specific examples of their supposed erosion through
the sanctioning process is highly adventitious. The connecting thread among
the various examples is even more so. The analytic framework, in short, is
not a help to the authors but rather a positive embarrassment. A second and
related consequence is that, lacking any coherent pattern for developing their
subject, the authors are reduced to multiplying examples in what appears to
be an effort to overwhelm by sheer weight of numbers. For example, the
longest chapter, on the Respect value, contains in thirty-seven pages upwards
of sixty examples of asserted malfunctions in sanctioning. The result, leaving
aside the dubious character of some of the examples, is an absence of anything
approximating sustained analysis.
There are more basic troubles, however. One inheres in the authors' strange
ambivalence about the meaning of the term "sanction." We are told at the
outset that a sanction is different from a "primary norm." The point is made
more than once in the early pages of the book.4 Yet much of the demonstration of the shortcomings in the sanctioning process is based on examples of
what I suppose everyone, including the authors, would view as "primary
norms." For example, the authors attack fault as a basis for divorce; 5 they
deplore the vagueness of antitrust standards;6 they question the wisdom of
restrictive laws dealing with sexual conduct.7 All of these may be points at
which the law is open to criticism-and I doubt that our lack of progress in
these matters can be attributed to a shortage of criticism-but it is obvious
that these failures, if failures they be, are failures of substance rather than of
sanctions.
If the authors seem at times to expand the concept of "sanction law" to
include everything that the term "law" includes, at other times they constrict
the concept in a way that is highly damaging to their call for a jurisprudence
of sanctions. They start, sensibly if not as originally as they seem to think,
with the observation that sanctions are not limited to the punishments infficted under the law of crimes but rather include all measures taken to encourage compliance with legal norms. It is important to take that expansive
a view, they assert, because "failure to consider the sanctioning process as a
4"Prescriptions can be roughly classified as primary and sanctioning propositions, the
former articulating a norm of conduct preferred by the body politic, the latter specifying
the actions to be taken especially when breaches of the norm occur." P. 9.
"Sanctions are deprivations or indulgences of individual and group values for the purpose of supporting the primary norms of a public order system." P. 14.
6
5 P. 115.
pp. 134-36.
7p. 123.
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whole has resulted, to a significant degree, in some of the most damaging
faults of our legal order." 8 We are to expect, then, an attempt "to consider
the sanctioning process as a whole": a large order-too large, it soon appears,
for the authors. What they have given they quickly take away:
Since we have the perspective of entire communities in view it is clear tlat
economy of effort calls for selection, and that [sic-therefore?] we choose
for legal study those prescriptions that are expected to be enforced with a
high degree of severity against deviates and that involve specialized representatives of the community in the process of sanctioning.9
Put less obscurely, this is to be a book about the shortcomings of the criminal
sanction and other publicly administered measures of social control. But I
should have thought it precisely relevant to the authors' initial complaint for
them to consider what criteria can be developed for deciding when "specialized representatives of the community" should be involved in the sanctioning
process and when initiative is better left in private hands. The claims they
make for the study of "sanction law" lose a good deal of their force when
the subject is limited to highly afflictive publicly administered sanctions. And
it only confuses thought to start with an expansive definition of sanctions, as
the authors do, and then proceed to use the term in a much more restrictive
way, adhering all the while to the claims they make for the more expansive
reading. Throughout, the examples of "present failures" are drawn predominantly (about 75% by rough count) from the criminal law. Near the end of the
book, the authors pretty much let the cat out of the bag by admitting that
they do not regard "controversies over contracts and torts" as involving the
application of sanctions: "The typical policy considerations that figure in
problems presented to community decision makers under the supervisory
code [their term for prescriptions whose enforcement is left to private initiative] are remedies rather than sanctions."10 What this does to their original
position is obvious.
Both of these ambiguities-the treatment of sanctions as equivalent to law
in general and the countervailing restriction of sanctions to the criminal law
and its penumbra-seem to me to reflect a basic shortcoming in the authors'
approach. Although they denounce formalism in others, it can be justly asserted that their view is itself formalistic in the extreme. Their concern with
the elaborate conceptual apparatus of "value-institution study" precludes any
attempt to undertake what I should have supposed was the obvious line of
inquiry: assuming a hypothetically desirable norm, what is the spectrum of
sanctions----"public" or "private"--available to give it effect? What are the
advantages, what are the disadvantages of a given sanction or combination of
sanctions? Is the primary norm one that we will wish to support through sanctions once we understand what the sanctions are likely to cost? It is the inter8p. 5.

9p. 10.

loP. 231.
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play between primary norm and sanctioning possibilities that gives rise to the
distinctive problems of sanctioning in the legal order and it is through the
close study of that interplay in different situations that we may eventually
hope to develop ajurisprudence of sanctions.' All of this the authors ignore.
A possible explanation of this failure to view the problem of sanctions as an
aspect of the legal process generally may lie in an oientation that seems to
blind the authors to the importance of distinctively private, self-applying
regimes of legal order. This indifference, in turn, appears to derive from the
view that "community policy" is an ascertainable guide to the control of
social behavior. There is a strange paradox for me in a system of thought that
stresses the importance of the widest possible sharing of values, including
power, yet that sees "community policy" as a White Goddess served by an
elite priesthood of enlightened decision-makers.1 2 However beneficent the
Platonism that inspires it, I am uneasy about a cast of mind that produces
observations like this one: "Defense counsel too often appears to act as the
'mouthpiece' of a dubious client rather than as an instrument of community
policy."1 3 That makes me bridle, and shudder a bit, too.
It must also be said that the authors' attacks on shortcomings in contemporary sanctioning arrangements are frequently polarized to the point of distortion and, too often, uninformed. To what extent this tendency derives from
the rapid-transit survey method they adopt and to what extent it results from
their view that problems some consider hard are really very easy I am unable
to say. A few examples, drawn from the chapter entitled "Sanctioning Measures and the Sharing of Respect," may illustrate what I mean by these strictures.
The authors attack the disparity in criminal penalty provisions from one
state to another.14 The point seems to be that it is invidiously discriminatory
for a robber to be subject to a maximum of five years' imprisonment in one
state and ten years' in another. Why this is bad the authors do not say. Would
they also look with disfavor upon indeterminate sentencing, under which
each robber may be treated somewhat differently from his fellow-robbers?
Would they prefer a situation in which all states have uniformly severe penalties to one in which some are severe and others light? If not, "discrimina11Questions of this order are posed with much discernment in

HART

& SACKS, TiE

LEGAL PRocEss (Tent. Ed. 1958), a work that the authors might profitably have consulted.
See, in particular, pp. 770-88, 905-13.
12For an account of the development of Lasswell's political ideas, see BRmAci, NEOFREUDIAN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY ch. 7 (1961). The following passage is particularly apposite:
"By the 1950's Lasswell had boxed the compass of political science. From the cool reporting
of hard and often unpleasant facts he had turned political science into an almost sentimental
defense of a preferred set of values. A study of influence and the influential that had unmistakable anti-democratic implications had become a study of power that paradoxically rationalized an egalitarian society replete with individual rights." Id. at 175.
13P. 91.
14 P. 28.
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tion," however defined, hardly seems the gravamen of their complaint. This
and similar examples of "discrimination" in legislative prescriptions are
capped by the observation that "Moreover, thus far at least, none of these
forms of discriminatory legislation has met with serious challenge on constitutional grounds."15 I should like to believe that this sentence is a superb demonstration of deadpan humor, but the context suggests that it is serious.
Throughout, the authors display a penchant for the easy generalization,
aggravated by an almost obsessive preoccupation with what they discern as
sinister official motives. Thus, the felony-murder rule (sanction or primary
norm?) is characterized as resulting from "the concern of men of property for
property.". 6 I doubt that many will agree. The well-known deficiencies of the
felony-murder rule probably result not from any such conscious aim but
rather from premature over-generalization by common-law judges, compounded by legislative inertia. As for the authors' next example of "the concern of men of property for property," the disparity of penalties in a given
jurisdiction for assault and robbery, it is enough to observe that the chaos in
sentencing provisions in American penal codes is not the result of bad thoughts;
it is the result of no thought.
Other difficult problems receive equally jejune treatment as the authors rush
from example to example. The scope and timing of judicial review of the exercise of summary powers to condemn or quarantine is not an easy problem,
but one would never guess that there is a problem at all from the authors'
denunciation of a decisionl 7 denying habeas corpus to one summarily quarantined. Gregoire v. BiddlelS is roundly denounced, but the question ofjust what
sanctions ought to be available against government officials who inflict or
threaten to inflict malicious harms while purporting to act in their official
capacity is not dealt with. Indeed, there is no suggestion that such a question
exists.19 Costello v. United States20 is treated as having "furnished carte
blanche to federal Grand Jury investigators to found their indictments on
gossip, hearsay, and suspicion." 2 1 The authors' puzzlement at the "strange
unanimity" 22 of a Supreme Court opinion written by that old enemy of the
Bill of Rights, Hugo Black, might have been dispelled if they had stopped to
think about the efficacy of the rule that Costello supplanted. Under that
highly formalistic view, indictments founded on hearsay could stand if there
was even a scintilla of competent evidence, however marginal, before the
grand jury. Although there are overly-broad statements in the opinion, the
IsPp. 30-31.
16 p. 30.
17State ex rel. McBride v. Superior Court, 103 Wash. 409, 174 Pac. 973 (1918).
Is177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
19 Compare the discerning treatment of the subject in HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1215-24 (1953).
20 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
21 P. 33.
22 Ibid.
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gist of Costello is its rejection of the view that rules of evidence designed to
control the course of adversary proceedings should also control the grand
jury process. In lieu of stopping to think about all this, the authors might
merely have taken note of the thoughtful treatments in a number of leading
law reviews supporting the Costello result.2 3
And so it goes, page after page, example after example.
The authors' cavalier way with hard problems is-,not limited to "legal"
analysis. They assert that capital punishment bears unequally upon disadvantaged groups, particularly upon Negroes. I am quite prepared to believe that
it does and to view that fact as one of the weightiest objections that can be
levelled against capital punishment. But I can hardly accept the evidence they
adduce as very probative, much less believe that it will convince those who
need convircing. The evidence consists solely of a table showing the number
of persons executed in the United States, by race and offense, for the years
1930-1959. It shows, simply, that almost as many Negroes as whites were
executed for murder and that far more Negroes than whites were executed
for rape. It does not show the distribution of Negroes and whites in the
population. Nor does the table show anything about the number of capital
offenses known to the police as distributed by race of the alleged offender,
the number of alleged offenders as so distributed who were prosecuted, convicted, etc. I have little doubt what the relevant statistics would show. But
surely the table in question does not show it. Yet the authors tell us solemnly
that the table is "official" and that it "shows a shocking preponderance of
Negroes over whites among persons executed." 24
The evidence for assertions is not always thin. Sometimes it is non-existent.
We are told, for example, that
The situation [of indigent defendants in criminal cases] is aggravated by
the fact that under the pressure of chronically congested dockets most of
our state courts repeatedly tolerate a lapse of many months between indictment and trial. These are the operational facts as distinct from the doctrinal prescription of a 'speedy trial.'25
No supporting citation is given, which somewhat compounds the difficulty
of interpreting words like "most," "repeatedly" and "many months."
Given the authors' shotgun approach, it was perhaps inevitable that little
of substance could have been said about any of the examples. At most, as I
have suggested, they add up to a catalogue of injustices, most of them quite
familiar. So far as their relation to each other or to "the sharing of respect"
goes, they might just as well have been put in alphabetical order or drawn'
one by one from a hat. And they do nothing to buttxess the authors' previous23 See, e.g., Notes, 43 CAUF. L. REv. 859 (1955); 69 HARv. L. REv. 383 (1955); 104 U.
PA. L. REV. 429 (1935); 65 YALE L. J. 390 (1956). Compare Note, 55 MIcH. L. REv. 389
(1956), disapproving of Costello in a treatment almost as cursory as the authors'.
24 P. 56.
25 Ibid.
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ly quoted justification for the book: "the failure to consider the sanctioning
process as a whole has resulted, to a significant degree, in some of the most
damaging faults of our legal order." If the authors' assertion is only that
American criminal law is in a bad way, their message is not earth-shaking,
nor does it require "a five stage problem-solving model, seven functional
categories of decision making, eight goal values, five objectives of sanctioning,
five legal codes, and four characteristics fundamental to prescribing an adequate sanctioning system" 2 j to elucidate the point.
The book's failure in the large makes all the more noticeable some venial
sins of presentation. Quotations are wrenched from their context, often with
misleading effect.2 7 The use of authority is, to put it charitably, whimsical. 2 8
Large segments of the book appear to have been written with a pair of scissors. Even syntax suffers. 2 9 The stigmata of haste and carelessness abound.
All of these particular shortcomings, damaging as they are, fade into insignificance when we return, as we must, to the authors' failure to establish any
meaningful connection between the catalogue of injustices to which Part I of
the book is devoted and their central proposition: that these injustices result
from failure to "consider the sanctioning process as a whole." The problems
of the legal order are too diverse and too intractable to yield to the solvent
of Grand Theory.30 The elaborate conceptual apparatus 3 ' that the authors

propose bringing to bear on sanctioning problems is not likely to "inspire"
-or

even "provoke"-the work that they think needs to be done. 32 Their

26 Robinson, Book Review, 30 GEo. WAsHI. L. REv. 155, 160 (1961).
27 A single example will have to suffice. The authors' discussion of the discrimination
latent in differing criminal penalties for the same offense in different states is climaxed with
this observation: "Depending only on the locus in quo the law thus lays 'an unequal hand
on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense ... ' " P. 56.
The reference is to Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court in Skinner v. Olahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), invalidating a sterilization statute applicable to "habitual criminals" on the ground that the definition of that term was not based on a rational classification
since, inter alia, "larceny" convictions qualified but "embezzlement" convictions did not.
2
s Again, a single example will have to do. After a reference to Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956), the authors suggest that if its principle is extended to other means of legal
assistance, "an improvement [in the plight of indigent criminal defendants] may at last be
in sight." But they conclude dolefully, "at this stage, however, the possibility is highly speculative." P. 50.
One would at this point expect a reference to post-Griffin experience, but the citation
turns out to be an article published six years before Griffin.
29
See, e.g., the sentences quoted supranotes 8 & 9. Sometimes the difficulty is more than
syntactical. What, for example, does this sentence mean? "When sanctionsare examined as
.a whole the result is to strengthen the factors that tend to bring sanction law into more consistent and effective harmony with the goals of the American system of public order-" P. 6.
(All italicized in original.)
30
The phrase, complete with derogatory implications, is borrowed from C. WRIGHT
MIULS, Tm SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (1959).
3
1 Developed in great detail in Part II of the book, particularly in Chapter 11.
32p. 11.
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prospectus is unconvincing. Perhaps a concrete demonstration of the utility
of their approach would yield more persuasive results. I suspect that the demonstration will have to come from their hands. They ate not likely to enlist
others.
HEnERT L. PACKER*
* Professor of Law, Stanford University.

The Legal Process: An Introduction to Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive, and Administrative Agencies. By CARL A. AUEMRACH,
LLOYD K. GARRISON, WILLARD HURST, and SAmuEL MmumN, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961. Pp. xxvii, 915. $10.00.
This superb book is designed, in the words of the authors, "to introduce
the beginning law student and the college upper classman and graduate student to the operation of our legal system." While there is no reason to assume
that course materials intended for one of these audiences would be less suitable for the others, this reviewer's perspective is primarily that of a teacher
of undergraduates in a liberal arts program and of graduate students in political science who envisage careers as university teachers or as government
servants.
In judging the value of this or any other work assigned for use as teaching
materials, one necessarily must evaluate an author's performance against
one's own criteria of the purposes to be served by a one-course treatment of
the role of law in the governing of our society. It is obvious, too, that one's
judgment must be influenced to some degree by the curricular resources available at a given institution. If such subjects as Roman law, constitutional law,
international law, comparative law, and English constitutional history are
available to students, then the selection of materials should avoid extensive
duplication of the coverage of other courses. But with this qualification, it
would seem that a judgment concerning the value of a text should be based
on its ability to help the instructor achieve the following objectives. First, the
course should make the student aware of the vital day-to-day role of law in
making possible, or more effective, the functioning of a complex society.
Stated differently, such a course should destroy the.widely-held view of most
liberal arts students that law is a technical body of material of only marginal
relevance to the real workaday world. The importance of the ability of the
legal system to furnish answers to problems of varying difficulty in an orderly
sustained way should be a dominant note in such a course. Secondly, it should
reveal to the student how the legal system operates. The form of reasoning
used by judges and lawyers, and the roles played by legislators, administrators, judges, and lawyers should be treated in sufficient depth so that legal
values and the results of legal reasoning can be compared with other forms of
decison-making, and so that students will see how legal institutions are relat-

